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Votes need rules, and our elections and referenda are conducted in accordance with pre-
established rules. By and large, these rules have focused on process: what specific procedures 
should be in place to make the vote one which is likely to produce a just outcome, accepted 
as legitimate even by those who voted for an individual who did not get elected, a party who 
failed to win a majority, or the referendum result other than the one for which they voted?  
Getting the process right is, therefore, crucial. An electoral outcome widely seen as 
illegitimate, will be one in which the result—elected government or referendum outcome—
fails to command authority and where some of those who voted come question the extent to 
which they are obliged to accept the outcome. The procedures according to which elections 
are conducted are central to a proper functioning democracy.  
Some countries extend the rules beyond these procedures to cover campaigning, including the 
role of the media, of pollsters and the activities of civil servants. In the UK we have rules 
regarding the media exposure given candidates and their parties during the campaign. In 
France there are rules regarding opinion polling in the days before the vote. In the UK, civil 
servants are bound by the rules of purdah, designed to ensure they remain impartial during an 
election campaign. 
So, rules are crucial to ensure the vote is accepted as just, so that the outcome is considered 
legitimate by the voters. But there is something missing here, and that something has been 
brought into view in the UK following the EU referendum vote in June 2016.  
The rules in place do not extend to campaign conduct in what we might refer to as the public 
sphere. Put another way, the rules do not seem to extend to what politicians say and how they 
conduct themselves in public during political campaigns. Electoral candidates and 
campaigners for one side or other in a referendum can, it seems, say pretty much anything 
they want within the law, as that law applies to all members of society. The temptation to go 
beyond what is true, what one honestly believes, is strong, for the campaign goal is to 
persuade as many of the electorate to vote for them or their cause as possible. Sometimes 
then, the temptation might be to tell lies (perhaps about how much money will be saved by a 
vote for them), or make empty promises (perhaps about where that money will be spent, once 
saved). One might be tempted to make liberal use of the dark arts of persuasion: where 
rational argument is foregone in favour of techniques of persuasion honed in advertising and 
public relations: nudges, framing, factoid production, persuasive definition, fearmongering, 
carrot-dangling, in-grouping and flattery. 
The way elections and votes are conducted in the public sphere is what this instalment in the 
five parameters series is about: should there be rules? Should we ensure the electorate are 
furnished with the skills to defend themselves against the dark arts?  
1. PRECAUTION.  
Future policy impact 
While politics is about society negotiating divergent ideologically-informed views, 
arguments and opinions on how we govern ourselves, how goods and services are 
distributed, and so on, there are some trans-ideological objective truths: the enacting of 
some policies will reliably disadvantage and hurt certain groups of people, for example. 
Without showing our cards here (what ideological suit are you?), we can make some 
observations based on this claim: If the result of a vote will lead to the disadvantage of a 
particular group, then it needs to be made clear that this is precisely what it will do. 
Campaigning in such a way that seeks to hide this consequence from the voters is 
unacceptable from a precautionary perspective, because if precautioning against future 
harm is important then we need to understand the consequences in as much detail as is 
available, so as to make our precaution-informed vote (this does not only apply to 
members of the potentially disadvantaged group: I want to know how my vote will 
impact on others). 
 
legitimacy 
A campaign won through liberal use of the dark arts, through lies and empty promises 
undermines the legitimacy of the outcome and consequently erodes the authority of the 
result. In some cases it might lead to a genuine crisis of democracy: where significant 
numbers of the electorate feel so disenfranchised that they question the value of their 
democratic institutions and seek other means of political change.  We should seek to take 
precautions against such future crisis, by ensuring legitimacy. 
 Public reason 
But there is another precautionary consideration: precautioning against the diminution of 
public reason. Let’s consider two models for gaining assent to a particular view: 
argument and (non-rational) persuasive techniques: which can be anything from the 
liberal use of persuasive definition to bare threats. Without entering into the parallel 
histories of philosophy and rhetoric, dating back to the origins of our subject in Plato’s 
critique of the Sophists, and without entering into discussions about argumentation theory 
and informal logic, we can make one claim about persuasion-via-argument: it is 
persuasion that has internal to it, that declares, its goal (conclusion) and methods 
(providing of reasons) for achieving that goal. The other persuasive techniques focus only 
on achieving the goal, and often hide the true nature of that. Their purpose is simply to 
gain the assent of the audience to the goal of the persuader by the most effective means 
available.  
If you value rational agreement among a community of reasoners then perhaps you also, 
for precautionary reasons, want to establish rules for campaigning which promote reason 
through the stating of argument.  
 
2. EVIDENCE.  
Evidence of misleading campaigning: lies, empty promises and fearmongering 
What is the evidence for the problems we are discussing? Here I propose that the recent 
campaign and aftermath of the EU referendum provides evidence. While all votes will 
lead to some questions being raised, particularly from those on the losing side, the EU 
referendum vote raised more than is generally expected. Some of this was focused on 
procedure: should a simple majority have been enough? Should EU nationals resident in 
the UK have been excluded? These are important questions, which should have been 
raised prior to the vote, though they are not our focus here. I want to focus on campaign 
conduct.  
It is now clear that statements made by the leave campaigns about the amount of money 
the UK paid to the EU was over-stated. Indeed, the campaign bus of the main leave 
campaign had this false figure written in large letters across the side, which also stated it 
could be invested in the NHS if we voted to leave. The day after the vote this was 
retracted.  
We could go on for some pages listing such examples: a campaign poster with strong 
parallels in Nazi propaganda was a low point in British politics on a number of levels, the 
promotion of xenophobia seems quite clearly to have led to a considerable upturn in racist 
and xenophobic abuse and violence, and so on. Of course, it would be remiss to give the 
impression that only one side employed problematic tactics: the remain campaign made 
liberal use of fear tactics too, including threats. 
So, exhibit one: the conduct of the UK’s EU referendum campaigns in 2016. Just go 
check out the huge number of newspaper articles on this which have appeared since the 
vote and the way this has led to large protests, legal challenges, recriminations, racist and 
xenophobic violence and abuse, and the possible break-up of the United Kingdom.  
 
Denigrating public reason 
Does the employment of the dark arts of persuasion lead to a denigration of public reason, 
which leads to a populace which is more susceptible to those dark arts in future and more 
likely to be swayed by populist sentiment and the agendas of those with the greatest 
means to employ those dark arts?  
There is good reason to think the answer is yes: One way in which we become proficient 
in a practice is by regular participation in that practice: I can watch as much Bruce Lee as 
time allows, but that will be no substitute for time at the dojo. I can talk with my seven 
year old son about swimming technique for weeks, but that will be no substitute for time 
in the pool. Why might the practices of argument, and of reasoned dialogue be 
significantly different? If the public sphere becomes dominated by the dark arts of 
persuasion, pushing out to the margins the role of reasoned dialogue, argumentation, and 
the value of truth-telling then that is akin to there being no dojos and no swimming pools.  
My editor here at TPM has recently written on this in his book The Persuaders, (and if 
you don’t buy this book you will be part of the problem, not the solution), and there does 
seem to be some evidence that less argument leads to a diminution in the skills required 
to make and understand argument; less rational dialogue leads to a diminution in the 
skills required to participate in rational dialogue. To swim in the sea of public discourse 
and defend ourselves against rhetorical attack we need to be practiced in the arts of 
reasoned argument and dialogue. 
 
3. POLITICAL ECONOMY  
Powerful market interests will seek to influence political campaigns in ways that benefit 
them. So, any society in which such interests are prominent (any market economy, for 
example) will be subject to attempts to influence political campaigns in the public sphere, 
through funding campaigns favorable to the funder or by joining the campaign as active 
participants. In joining campaigns, it is likely, perhaps, that in being the very groups 
which have been at the forefront of the development and employment of the dark arts of 
persuasion, they will seek to employ these when they enter political campaigns.  
There are then two considerations from the perspective of the parameter of political 
economy:  
Protection of the public sphere from the influence of powerful market interests, 
via the dark arts, in political campaigns. This will contribute to the promotion or 
preservation of rational dialogue.  
Protecting the public sphere from powerful interest groups will help guard against 
the hijacking of the democratic process, and ultimately the society, by those same 
interest groups, should it be in their long-term interests to do so.  
This is likely to be read as overly anti-market; it does not have to be so. One can be pro-
market, even radically so, while also believing that there should be clear checks and 
balances on the penetration and colonization of the public sphere and political campaigns 
by market and financial interests. 
 
4. ASYMMETRY 
Beyond the voters: ineligible, the absent and the voiceless 
Politics is not merely about the balancing of the interests of individuals who are eligible 
to vote. The outcome of the vote will be lived by many who did not have a vote, through 
formal ineligibility (e.g. EU residents in the UK in the EU referendum), through absence 
(e.g. future generations) and through voicelessness (e.g. those outside the polis who will 
be effected by the political decisions made within the polis. And, non-human animals).  
Moreover, in voting, individuals draw upon many non-instrumental forms of relationship 
to the world and others in that world: in addition to self-interest individuals might cast a 
vote informed by compassion, empathy, care, love, loyalty and solidarity, or a 
commitment to a particular ethical, political and/or economic worldview. To make a 
judgement drawing on any of these considerations, one needs to understand the 
arguments.  
Casting a vote in a way which gives due consideration to the impacts on the dis-  and 
non-enfranchised, the voiceless and those who will be impacted by the outcome of the 
vote, requires that the resources are available which provide the basis for that 
consideration. Lies, factoids and the use of persuasive techniques that hide the reasons 
that support the conclusion, and present the conclusion in a way which will make it most 
appealing, do not provide the required resources. 
 
Generating new asymmetries: domesticating the voters  
There is further consideration here too: with training, one can see through some of the 
persuasive techniques, one can get to the arguments behind the dark arts. In addition to 
training, this takes time. One of the things the artists of darkness exploit is the time-
pressed nature of much modern life. Few people read government White Papers or 
Judicial Inquiry reports, while many people hear soundbites, designed to work like the 
musical earworm, as the three-minute news bulletin plays on their radio. Asymmetry, 
therefore, figures here too: the dark arts, the persuasive tricks of the spin doctor’s and 
advertising exec’s trade, disproportionately exercise control over those with least time to 
check sources, search-out arguments and who have minimal resources on which to draw 
so that they might recognize a persuasive definition when they are confronted by one.   
While training in a martial art like Aikido serves to develop one’s skills in the art of self 
defence, there are also arts in which one can be trained that afford one protection against 
the rhetorical violence to which we are subject, not only in political campaigns but in our 
daily life, via advertising and marketing. 
 
 5. FRAMING.  
If we allow our reflections to be framed by libertarian conceptions of freedom, by 
negative liberty, then we will be suspicious of rules imposed on those individuals and 
their interactions in the public sphere.  
Conversely, if we frame our considerations via a political philosophy that sees genuine 
freedom, autonomy and good political judgement as being founded on public reason we 
will arrive at a different view on matters. For, on this view the public sphere, as the 
sphere in which reason lives, or withers and dies, needs to be supported and protected in 
such a way that reason will flourish.  
Resolving this tension between the goal of minimizing state controls and promoting a 
political ecosystem in which freedom can flourish through reason and reflection has been 
the topic of much political philosophy: what constraints on our freedom do we allow in 
the name of further greater freedoms? One of the problems is that that this line of 
reasoning, as Isiah Berlin and many others fear, can be put in the service of truly terrible 
crimes against whole populations of individuals, where (good) ends are used to justify 
(bad) means. On the other hand, allowing our discussion of the rules governing political 
campaigning in the public sphere to be framed by a conception of political freedom which 
sees freedom as freedom from state interference and constraint simply gives over the 
public sphere to powerful non-state interest groups (with no democratic mandate and no 
duty to represent) and ultimately allows it be hijacked by them. In a market economy, 
these interest groups will be those with the capital to execute the hijack most effectively. 
 
Conclusion 
All five of our parameters suggest that the rules governing our democratic institutions and 
practices should be extended beyond where they currently are. As some deliberative 
democrats have argued, as some progressive communitarians and socialists have argued, 
the public sphere needs protecting from powerful interests. Anarchist and libertarian 
arguments against such protections which invoke negative liberty are ultimately self-
defeating, because the very liberty they seek to protect from state interference will be 
destroyed by powerful non-state interests. 
Public reason needs promoting, and this is undertaken by our focusing not merely on 
individuals but on their political environment. We must ensure we have a political eco-
system in which rational dialogue and argument can flourish: this is not only done by 
engineering a public sphere which is less susceptible to hijacking by the exponents of the 
dark arts, through the establishment of rules, but also by ensuring the public, the voters, 
have the intellectual resources to protect themselves against those dark arts.  
